I suggest here ecologies of the nascent state, posing the following general questions: what is this state and what is it to live, to fabricate modes of life, in its immanence? I believe populating this state is, by right, ‘ecological’, even if what I offer here is only a sketch or glimpse, playful as it is, of the possibility of such modes of life, of dwelling. As I develop it here, the nascent is in flight of being. It is populated (...) by lesser, minoritarian existences. If it is ‘ecological’, it is because these existences, or modes of becoming, are themselves, in their own right, ‘ecologies’, that is, modes of dwelling, of life, on the ‘other side of existence’, as Antonin Artaud put it once, in exile from Being. The power to return eternally to the nascent state is the power to live, to dwell, in the absolute forgetfulness of Being, in the interstice where philosophy supposedly ends, but where it nevertheless begins again, in oblivion itself, where being is never already the verticality of Being, its difference with beings, but always nascent, in the beginning, eternally so. (shrink)

Can the brain become mind? If the question seems strange, aberrant even, it is perhaps due to the way the problem brain–mind is commonly presented, where what's repeatedly asked is whether the brain is or isn’t ‘mind’. Yet, if we take Deleuze and Guattari's provocation seriously, in the Conclusion of What is Philosophy?, the problem is radically recast: even if speculatively, that is, properly philosophically or conceptually, the brain, for them, involves its own becoming, both in terms of its ‘becoming-subject’ (...) and ‘becoming-mind’, as ‘Thought-brain’. I will explore references within Deleuze's philosophy in relation to the brain, namely in The Logic of Sense and his work on cinema, as I try to work out what this fantastic story (with necropolitical undertones) may in fact look like, the one where the brain not simply is but becomes, and in becoming, becomes mind…. (shrink)

Resumo Ainda que de modo introdutório, dizemos que existe um sujeito, o perverso, no interior da filosofia de Deleuze. Mais, que é tornando-se esse sujeito, fazendo do perverso um filósofo, que Deleuze dá início à sua filosofia, em Diferença e repetição e na Lógica do sentido. Ou seja, que existindo um devir-perverso do próprio Deleuze, esse devir condiciona uma abordagem à relação do seu pensamento com o tema da perversão, e isto por ser justamente a criação desse heterónimo, o perverso, (...) que está na origem da sua filosofia.Even if only schematically, we say there is a subject, the pervert, in Deleuze’s philosophy. More, that it is by becoming this subject, making the pervert a philosopher, that Deleuze brings about the beginning of his own philosophy in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. In other words, that there is such a thing as Deleuze’s very own becoming-pervert, being this becoming which conditions an understanding of the relation of his thinking with the question of perversion precisely because it is this heteronym, the pervert, who stands at the origin of his philosophy. (shrink)

This article combines Deleuze’s extraordinary analysis of Michel Tournier’s Friday, where we find the presentation of a duplicated, perverted, version of Robinson Crusoe when compared to Daniel Defoe’s classical version, with a critical analysis of conceptions such as being-in-the-world, stemming from Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. My point is that without Others [Autrui], or what Deleuze calls the structure-Other [structure Autrui], it is the very possibility of ‘interpreting’ being-in-the-world which is at stake, being a world without Others, the structure-Other, one wherein a (...) pre-ontological comprehension of being is ‘uncomprehended', no longer being it possible to attain a facticity of being precisely insofar as one lives, suffers, without Others, a process of an inverted nature, not so much of the facticity of being but of its ‘defacticization’. I propose, therefore, a new conception of the limit of being-in-the-world not in terms of death but of Others, of what it is to lose Others, the structure-Other, and how this loss implies losing being-in-the-world, the very possibility of interpreting, of comprehending its different structures. The concept of Others functions then as a giant fold between being-in-the-world and what Artaud called ‘the other side of existence’, but also between the absence of Others and the creation of ‘worlds without Others’, all of which ‘minor’, ‘desert islands’, ‘plateaus’, constituted in the immanence of this absence, of the ‘outside’. (shrink)